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I. INTRODUCTION
"When nature ceases to be an object of contemplation
and admiration, it can be nothing more than material for
an action that aims at transforming it. ",
Albert Camus' words speak to one of the most pressing issues of
our day: how are the actions of humans, es ?ecially those in the mod-
em industrial world, affecting our planet? Some human "transfor-
mation" of nature is beneficial to the environment. Despite this, not
everyone agrees that serious changes must take place in individual
1. VINE DELORIA JR., GOD IS RED 70 (1973).
2. See Edmund J. Skernolis, America's Going to Waste,
INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 63 (citing statistics indicating that
at the close of the 1980's America was producing trash at a rate of
160 million tons per year, or about 4 pounds per person per day with
the expectation that the rate would continue to rise).
3. See Henry Nor-, Drowning in E-waste; Safe Disposal of
Mountains of Old PC's, Monitors is a Snowballing Problem We've
Only Begun to Face, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 2001, at El (discussint
one of the by-products of the technological revolution of the late 20t
century is an environmental nightmare - specifically, hazards asso-
ciated with the rapid obsolescence and disposal of an estimated 500
million PC's between 1997 and 2007. This estimate, based on a
1999 study by the National Safety Council's Environmental Health
Center, does not include other consumer electronics expected to be
disposed of in large numbers such as televisions, cellular phones,
computer peripherals and hand-held computing units); cf. Patrick
McMahon, Where Does the TV Go When it Dies?, USA TODAY, Jan.
22, 2002, at 3A.
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and institutional behavior to create sustainable environments for fu-
ture generations.
This paper will examine how environmentalists have looked to the
value structures of the Native American culture by environmentalists
as a model of sustainable ecological ethics, and how this appeal has
spread, into the field of environmental law. 5 Hence, we are
4. See Barry E. Hill, Chester, Pennsylvania - Was it a Classic
Example of Environmental Injustice?, 23 VT. L. REV. 479, 483-85
(1999) (claiming that the goals of the modem environmental move-
ment are neatly ensconced within the National Environmental Policy
Act [hereinafter NEPA], 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1994) (stating that
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use
all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations
of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, func-
tions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may -
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the en-
vironment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and estheti-
cally and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environ-
ment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's
amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources)); see also
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)-(b)(6) (1994).
5. See generally Catherine A. O'Neill, Environmental Restora-
tion: Challenges for the New Millennium: Restoration Affecting Na-
tive Resources: The Place of Native Ecological Science, 42 ARIZ. L.
REV. 343 (2000) (excoriating governmental land management agen-
cies for their failure to recognize and accept Native American eco-
logical science and experiential knowledge as coequals with Western
science in debates that affect tribal resources).
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prompted to consider the extent to which integration of the Native
American ecological perspective and environmental law is desirable.
In the first part of this article, Native American attitudes and per-
spectives about land use are contrasted with attitudes of Americans
of European origin. It will be argued that the Native American per-
spective offers a unique, viable alternative to more modern ecologi-
cal views.
The alleged viability of the Native American perspective for con-
temporary policy will be developed in subsequent sections by focus-
ing on its application to the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").' The
ESA was chosen because of the ongoing deadlock in environmental
statutes in this domain. If the Native American perspective can be
useful in thinking about the ESA, then that perspective may have
broad applicability to environmental law. Part IV suggests how
value preferences inherent in Native American attitudes and land
ethic could inform current environmental regulatory attempts, such
as the ESA. Native American concepts can help illuminate value
conflicts that hinder funding and enforcement of the ESA.
II. NATIVE AMERICAN ECOLOGICAL ATTITUDES CAN OFFER A
DESIRABLE SET OF VALUE PREFERENCES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Perspectival Dichotomies: Native vs. Eurocentric Ecologies
Native American ecological perspectives and attitudes are mark-
edly different from those of European origin, and may offer a desir-
able model for an ecological perspective.
Although there is no singular Native American perception of the
environment, it would be difficult to construct a paper comparing
Native environmental views to non-Native environmental views
without making certain cautious generalizations about a Native land
ethic. Several specific themes arise time and again in the land ethics
of many different Native American nations and these themes provide
the foundation for our depicting of a Native American land ethic.
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
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1. The Relation between Humans and Earth
The idea of a "natural hierarchy" is one of the key concepts sepa-
rating Native beliefs about the land from those of most non-Natives
in North America. Whereas Native peoples tend to see themselves
as equal to the rest of creation, non-Native peoples generally view
humans as superior and therefore entitled to dominate nature.
Commenting on this dichotomy, Jackie Yellow Tail, a Crow Indian,
stated:
"Life is a circle, the world is a circle. The Christian way
of seeing the world is that within this circle there's a man
called Jesus; on the outside is the trees, the rocks, the
animals; all around the world are the different things that
are on Mother Earth. In the center is man above all
things. The Indian way of thinking is that there is this
same circle, Mother Earth, and around her are the rocks,
the trees, the grass, the birds, the four-leggeds, and man.
Man is the same as all those other things, no greater, no
less. I mean, it's all so simple; people make it so hard.",
7
Creation stories in Native religions reflect this idea of natural
equality.
Vine Deloria Jr., a noted Native author and activist of Lakota
Sioux heritage argues, "...the majority of stories of origin suggest a
creation in which people are given, simultaneous with their creation,
awareness that they have been created. These traditions often sug-
gest that there was no essential spiritual/intellectual difference be-
tween people and animals." 8 All of creation, not humanity alone, has
its own intelligence. Thus, nature can enrich human life and knowl-
edge when people observe natural phenomena and the actions of
other creatures in their natural habitats. 9
The absence of natural hierarchical structure in many Native relig-
ions leads to another component of Native American thought: the
belief that all life forms have rights equal to the rights of humans. 10
7. MARK ST. PIERRE & TILDA LONG SOLDIER, WALKING IN THE
SACRED MANNER 14 (1995).
8. VINE DELORIA JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES 233 (1995).
9. Annie L. Booth & Harvey M. Jacobs, Ties That Bind: Native
American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness,
12 ENVTL. ETHICS 27, 32 (1990).
10. WARD CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND 434 (1993).
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Members of a natural environment are responsible to stay in balance
with nature and no one group should dominate over the others. Thus,
Native Americans see humankind as just a small piece of the natural
puzzle, not a dominating force. 11
2. Distance vs. Connection
While detachment is demanded by Western science, 12 connection
to the environment is inherent in native thought. Western thinkers
have been distanced from the environment by the belief that observ-
ers of phenomena should refrain from interacting with the nature
they are observing.
13
Contrary to this assumption of Western science, Native people
have traditionally gained much of their knowledge about the natural
world by immersing themselves in their natural environment. As
Deloria states, "Indians.. .obtain information from birds, animals,
rivers, and mountains which is inaccessible to modern sci-
ence.. .Indians also know that human beings must participate in
events, not isolate themselves from occurrences in the physical
world." 14 The Native relationship with the environment is as active
participant, not cool observer.
11. J. DONALD HUGHES, AMERICAN INDIAN ECOLOGY 14 (1983).
12. DELORIA, supra note 1, at 55.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 56; but see Jeff Minerd, Native Americans vs. Environ-
mentalists, THE FUTURIST, May-June 2000, at 10 (assuming that Na-
tive communities did indeed gather a wealth of ecological knowl-
edge from their eco-philosophical perspectives, "history shows that
American Indians were not always wise or harmonious managers of
their environment. Many Native American hunters believed that, as
long [as] they offered respect to the animals they killed, the animals
would be reincarnated to be hunted again; these hunters had no con-
cept of conservation. Historical accounts describe Native Americans
driving buffalo over cliffs and killing them by the hundreds, often
taking only select cuts from the animals and leaving the rest to rot.
The vanished Hohokam people of Arizona may have disappeared
because they destroyed the fertility of their land by over-irrigating
their fields with salinated water - a mistake European farmers have
made in other times and places").
20031
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Additionally, Deloria implies that Western thought patterns, focus-
ing as they do on disconnection from nature, limit humans from fully
understanding the world around them. The "outside" roles assumed
by Western peoples place them away or apart from the environment,
acting as an observing or dominating force, not a part of nature.
From the Native American perspective, this lack of connection to the
natural world has allowed non-Native people in North America to
damage the earth and its ecosystems.
Many Indians also believe that people have the responsibility to
take care of the earth. This feeling of duty to care for the earth leads
to a true love for the land itself. As expressed by Luther Standing
Bear, a Lakota chief born in 1868:
"The Lakota was a true naturist... He loved the earth and
all things of the earth, the attachment growing with age.
The old people came literally to love the soil and they sat
or reclined on the ground with a feeling of being close to
a mothering power...He knew that man's heart away from
nature becomes hard; he knew that lack of respect for
growing, living things soon led to lack of respect for hu-
mans too."'
5
Some Native peoples fear that dependency on modern devices is
cutting them off from nature and the land. Voicing this concern,
Reuben Snake, a Winnebago, argues:
"What does it add to the quality of life to have a TV in
every room, and drive four cars, and fly across the conti-
nent in three hours? It doesn't make me a better human
being to be in contact with all that.. .the Indian is a part of
the creation, and we're supposed to fit into and be har-
monious with the creation - to live in harmony with all
that's going on, and not to have the thought that we can
dominate any part of it."' 
6
3. Objectification/Commodification vs. Identification
Perhaps one of the simplest and most direct commentaries on Na-
tive land perception comes from Paula Gunn Allen, a writer of La-
guna Pueblo and Lakota heritage, "We are the land. To the best of
15. T.C. MCLUHAN, TOUCH THE EARTH 6 (1971).
16. RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER, SHARED VALUES FOR A TROUBLED
WORLD 26 (1994).
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my understanding, that is the fundamental idea that permeates
American Indian life; the land (Mother) and the people (mothers) are
the same."'17 Not only do Native people tend to view themselves as
connected to nature and on a level plane with their surroundings, the
land defines an integral part of their being as independent Native
nations and as a people. Thus, the land cannot be separated from
their group identity.'
8
Similarly, Peter Matthissen, author of In the Spirit of Crazy Horse,
writes, "In a proper (Indian) life there is never a sense of disconnect-
edness from the earth.. .the whole universe is sacred, man is the
whole universe.. .Respect for nature is respect for oneself; to revere it
is self respecting, since man and nature, though not the same thing,
are not different..." 19
Deloria contrasts native interrelationship, connectedness and bal-
ance with the objectification and exploitation by western peoples.2z
Deloria would argue that Europeans have allowed themselves to de-
grade and destroy the land because they feel distanced from it and
thus can turn the earth into a commodity.
The value of land to Native Americans is reflected in their prac-
tices of ownership. Codes of land "ownership" have varied from na-
tion to nation, but in general land was held in common by the entire
group. Because of the differences between Native ideas and Euro-
pean ideas on land ownership, there were numerous misunderstand-
ings between European settlers and Native groups related to the
"purchase" of Native land. For instance, Miles Standish "bought" a
tract of land fourteen miles square for seven coats, eight hoes, nine
hatchets, ten yards of cloth, twenty knives, and four moose skins, but
was confused when the local Indians kept hunting on the land after
the purchase. These Indians believed that Pilgrims had paid for the
use of the land that was held in common by the tribe, whereas the
English believed they possessed exclusive rights to the land. The
agreement the English interpreted to be a sort of deed the Indians
perceived to be an agreement to share the land. 2' Massasoit (Wam-
panoag), the chief who sold Standish the land stated:
17. PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED HooP 119 (1992).
18. See Booth & Jacobs, supra note 9, at 34.
19. Booth & Jacobs, supra note 9, at 40.
20. DELORIA, supra note 1, at 78.
21. DONALD A. GRINDE & BRUCE E. JOHNSON, ECOCIDE OF
NATIVE AMERICA 31 (1995).
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"What is this you call property? It cannot be the earth.
For the land is our mother, nourishing all her children,
beasts, birds, fish, and all men. The woods, the streams,
everything on it belongs to everybody and is for the use
of all. How can one man say it belongs to him only?
' 22
Native peoples identify with their land in another important regard
- in the intimate connection a particular nation's land has with its
history and its dead. Because ancestors are buried in land held in
common by the entire nation, selling the land is equated with selling
their history as a people, selling their identity. Once again, this re-
luctance to part with the land demonstrates the feelings of many Na-
tive people that they are inseparable from the land, if not part of the
land itself.
In one striking example of this ancestral tie to the land, a delega-
tion of Cayuse Indians responded, when asked to sign a treaty in
1855 releasing their land to the United States government, "Why
should we want a few goods in exchange for our lands? We love
our country - it is composed of the bones of our people, and we will
not part with it." 23 Similarly, Utes present day in the southwest were
presented with an offer from the federal government to sell some of
their land, a delegation responded, "The tribe doesn't want to dimin-
ish the land, but not because of money issues. You diminish us
when the land is eaten away.
24
According to Native Americans, the failure of non-Natives to iden-
tify personally with the land has led to the subsequent destruction of
the North American continent. Furthermore, they argue that until
non-Natives can understand the American soil, they cannot hope to
understand the Native peoples. As Standing Bear says,
"The white man does not understand the Indian for the
reason that he does not understand America. He is too far
removed.. .the roots of the tree of his life have not yet
grasped the rock and soil. The white man is still troubled
with primitive fears; he still has in his consciousness the
perils of this frontier continent..."
25
22. Id. at 30.
23. FROM THE HEART: VOICES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 335
(Lee Miller ed., 1996) [hereinafter VOICES].
24. Booth & Jacobs, supra note 9, at 35.
25. VOICES, supra note 23, at 254.
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Non-Native Americans, from the Native perspective, tend to fixate
on money and property, rather than identification with the soil.
These materialistic obsessions have dictated their actions,26 allowing
them to objectify and commodify the land to the point of blindness.
Europeans have pursued profit at the expense of the earth, other peo-
ple, and other creatures, thus lacking the sense of balance that Native
Americans hold as crucial to their philosophy. As expressed by John
Fire Lame Deer:
"More and more animals are dying out. The animals,
which the Great Spirit put here, they must go. The man-
made animals are allowed to stay - at least until they are
shipped out to be butchered. That terrible arrogance of
the white man, making himself something more than
God, more than nature, saying, "This animal must go, it
brings no income, the space it occupies can be used in a
better way."27
Native peoples were perhaps the first to point out that European
peoples lacked foresight; that Eurocentric objectification and wanton
disregard for the earth would lead to destruction. In identifying with
the earth, Native peoples realized that there was a delicate balance
inherent in nature. This balance, one that they had worked so hard to
maintain, was being disrupted and if such destructive actions contin-
ued, many Native peoples realized the outcome would be disas-
trous. 28 This knowledge of the eventual downfall of the non-Native
26. But see George Cornell, Native American Perceptions of the
Environment, in BURIED ROOTS AND INDESTRUCTIBLE SEEDS: THE
SURVIVAL OF AMERICAN INDIAN LIFE IN STORY, HISTORY, AND
SPIRIT 21-41 (Mark A. Lindquist & Martin Zanger eds., 1993).
27. John Fire Lame Deer & Richard Erdoes, Talking to the Owls
and Butterflies, in REREADING AMERICA 595 (Gary Colombo et. al.
eds., 1995).
28. But see Thomas McIntyre, The Conservation Myth, 216
SPORTS AFIELD 16, 19 (1996). (While there exists ample evidence to
support Native assertions that European environmental perspective
has the potential for breeding ecological disaster, there also exists
evidence that suggests Native practices left perceptible marks upon
the environment. According to McIntyre, "Dr. Valerius Geist be-
lieves that the pre-contact Indian actually placed 'a very heavy hand'
upon the continent's wildlife. Wherever he could find a steady
source of plant food or fatty fish, such as salmon, big game was
2003]
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land "ethic" is quite aptly put in a letter Chief Seal'th (commonly
known as Chief Seattle) wrote to President Pierce in 1855. Chief
Seal'th stated:
"We know that the white man does not understand our
ways. One portion of the land is the same to him as the
next.. .The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and
when he has conquered it, he moves on.. .The air is pre-
cious to the red man. For all things share the same breath
- the beasts, the trees, the man. Like a man dying for
many days, he is numb to the stench. 29
B. Subtracting European Influence
Given the previous discussion, it can be argued that historically
many Native nations had respect for the earth and demonstrated rev-
erence for their lands and nature in general. Consequently, it is
within the realm of possibility that if Europeans had not invaded the
North American continent, the Native land ethic would have been
determinative.
scarce. Not only was big game affected, either. Kay points out that
the blackening of the skies by the passenger pigeon was probably a
short-lived phenomenon, the Native American probably having
gathered up most of the pigeon's mast crop for himself, thereby
keeping the birds' numbers at a lower level. The tremendous abun-
dance of wildlife the settlers and explorers encountered as they ven-
tured into North America between 1600 and 1850 was, in fact, says
Geist, not a product of the Indian's 'ecologically sound concept of
nature,' but rather the result of the introduced disease, warfare, and
the European's relentless slaughter of the Indian population, all of
which cleared the way for a resurgence of wildlife across vast areas
of the land, the passenger pigeon and bison being only two of the
more spectacular examples. Geist contends that the Edenic land-
scape and plentiful, native wildlife.. .were not evidence of a virgin
wilderness. They were, instead, evidence of a highly manipulated
and not always well-used land unbound and allowed to reclaim old
boundaries").
29. Letter from Chief Seattle to President Pierce (1855) in THE
LITTLE BROWN READER 626-27 (Marcia Stubbs & Sylvan Barnet
eds., 1992).
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Two major analytical strands provide evidence for such an asser-
tion. First, an examination of historic Native land use patterns, Na-
tive economic structures, the ways in which Native societies adapted
their social structures to conform to the land, and how these struc-
tures came to be altered by Europeans will prove useful to our argu-
ment. Second, remarks made by several Native people of various
nations living in the modern day and their attitudes towards the cur-
rent American land ethic provides evidence of a strong desire to re-
turn to a more traditional land ethic, suggesting that without Euro-
pean influence, Native peoples would have retained a land ethic very
similar to the one exhibited by their ancestors.
1. Traditional Land Use, Native Economic Structure, and Societal
Adaptations to the Land
Different Native peoples had different views of acceptable land
use, contrary to popular belief, most Native groups did not live in an
unaltered or pristine wilderness. 30 In fact, most Native groups were
not hunter/gatherers, but agriculturally based, 31 and used the land
quite extensively. Most native nations did not deplete their environ-
ment, evidenced by the great abundance of plants and animals the
Europeans discovered upon coming to the North American conti-
32nent. As noted by Ward Churchill, "North America was invariably
described as being a 'pristine wilderness' at the point of European
arrival, despite the fact that it had been occupied by 15 or 20 million
people enjoying a remarkably high standard of living for who knows
how long: 40,000 years? 50,000 years? Longer?"
33
How is it possible that Native peoples could attain a sustainable
way of life despite intensive land use and widespread agriculture? In
part, this was the result of using several farming practices that were
quite different from those of their European counterparts and much
more considerate of their natural surroundings. For example, Native
peoples who farmed in southern New England employed the tech-
nique of using multi-crop fields. Because beans, squash, and corn
were grown together, the soil did not become exhausted of nutrients
rapidly as certain crops replenished the field with nutrients other
30. See HUGHES, supra note 11, at 4.
31. See CHURCHILL, supra note 10, at 16.
32. See GRINDE & JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 44.
33. CHURCHILL, supra note 10, at 420.
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crops withdrew from the soil. Using this method of natural fertiliza-
tion, the soil was exhausted in 8 to 10 years. 34 Some of these farm-
ing methods employed by Native peoples drew two to three times
the nourishment from the soil as farmers do today.
35
Besides altering the land for agricultural purposes, Native peoples
burned away sections of woodland in Cape Cod and New England to
create open areas for birch, pine, and other shrubs. This method of
clearing resulted in a landscape that was patch-worked with many
ecosystems in different stages of development. Additionally, the
burning of hardwood forests expanded the boundary area between
forest and grasslands, creating ideal habitats for wildlife. These
boundary or "forest edge" areas promoted growth in populations of
elk, deer, beaver, turkey, and quail as well as the predators which
preyed on those animals such as eagles, foxes, and wolves. Thus, in
burning away wooded area, the Native peoples of New England In-
dians consciously raised populations of game as well as destroyed
the dense underbrush that would have grown too thick to pass
through if left untouched.36
Native groups in New England and other regions of North America
had an intimate knowledge of how nature worked. For example,
Indians knew which animals and plants to gather and in which sea-
son; as a result, many nations simply relocated their villages to
where populations were most concentrated rather than stay in one
34. WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS,
COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 48 (1983).
35. JAMES D. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME 113 (1995).
36. CRONON, supra note 34, at 51; but see Bruce Bartlett, Native
Americans Weren't Very Kind to the Environment, HUMAN EVENTS
22 (2000) (citing Robert Whelan, WILD IN THE WOODS: THE MYTH
OF THE NOBLE EcO-SAVAGE (1999). Bartlett and Whelan assert that
one should not jump to conclusions that the fires set by Natives were
necessarily ecologically friendly. "For starters, Native Americans
were big forest burners. Indeed, before the white man came to this
hemisphere there was virtually no virgin forest because it had all
repeatedly been burned .... the reason is simple: Forests had almost
no value to Native Americans and interfered with hunting. Says
Whelan, 'The species which the Indians most wanted to hunt, like
bison, moose, elk and deer; are found most easily in areas of recently
burnt forest, which is why they burnt the forests over and over
again."')
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place and deplete the land.37 Often the size of villages would change
with the season as groups broke up or came together wherever it was
expected the most food would be found. Many Native groups
adapted their lifestyle to fit the land, rather than adapt the land to fit
38their lifestyle. Ecological demands were minimized by moving
from place to place, keeping population at a minimum, killing only
animals needed to survive, and using knowledge of nature and the
changing seasons to advantage.
39
In addition, many Native peoples were traditionally quite frugal,
enabling sustainable economies that did not tax the environment, and
where there was little profit motive, minimal surplus production,
almost no economic growth, and a reliance on a barter system.4 °
Additionally, Native economies often did not produce at maximum
levels and most Native groups did not use available labor, technol-
ogy, or resources to the fullest potential. It would seem, then, that
Native peoples preferred to have a shorter workday of three to five
hours and more days off rather than extra material possessions. As a
result of this reluctance to promote maximum production, Native
economies did not use their environments to the fullest potential, nor
did most Native nations strive to support as many people as they
could have. In this way, the nations and their economies remained
very sustainable.4 '
Many Native groups realized that in addition to frugality, popula-
tion control was another key to a prosperous, sustainable lifestyle.
Optimal population size was generally determined by evaluating the
number of people that could live in a particular region without over-
taking or destroying the environment. In other words, Native peo-
ples often allowed the land to decide the maximum number of peo-
ple in their particular nation.42 In accordance with maintaining lim-
ited populations, controls were often integrated into Native religious
practices. For example, sexual abstinence was a purification rite in
many rituals and ceremonies. Another custom among the Cheyenne
people was for a man to vow not to have another child for seven to
fourteen years after his first child so that all of his energy could be
37. CRONON, supra note 34, at 37.
38. CRONON, supra note 34, at 38.
39. Id. at 53.
40. JERRY MANDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SACRED 216 (1991).
41. Id. at 250.
42. CHURCHILL, supra note 10, at 433.
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concentrated on raising the one.43 Along with such customs and
rites, Native peoples had a very developed knowledge of menstrual
cycle and knew of medicines that could cause abortions if desired."
Native American lifestyles can be described as more environmen-
tally friendly than their European successors on American soil, it is
inaccurate to overly romanticize the relationship of Native peoples to
the earth and believe that the Natives did not manipulate their land at
all.
While it is true that Plains Indians did engage in this sort of hunt-
ing method, they did so only after the Europeans had introduced the
horse to the North American continent. Ultimately, the demise of the
plains buffalo was due to deliberate efforts on the part of American
settlers in the mid-1800's, not to actions of the Plains nations them-
selves. '5
2. Modem Day Native Voices
The influence of European ecological perspectives on the North
American continent is further highlighted by the current debate over
"traditional" versus "assimilated" ecological behavior by modem
day Native Americans. Deloria writes:
"A good deal of the political turmoil on the reservations
today is between traditional people and more assimilated
people over the use of land and resources. Traditional
43. HUGHES, supra note 11, at 97.
44. Id. at 98.
45. GRINDE & JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 28; but see John J.
Miller, Buffaloed, NATIONAL REVIEW, Oct. 9, 2000, at 28. (The as-
sertion that Native communities played only an ancillary role in the
destruction of the buffalo is, at the very least, debatable. "Indians
were remarkably efficient buffalo killers, with individual hunters
dressing in skins to get close shots, and groups of them driving
whole herds off cliffs. It's becoming increasingly clear that Indians
inflicted an enormous amount of damage on this Edenic symbol of
wild North America. In his recent book THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN,
Shepard Krech III of Brown University writes that Indian belief sys-
tems contributed to over-hunting. Many Plains Indians thought that
if even a single buffalo were allowed to escape from hunters, it
would alert others; as a result of this belief, the hunters would 'kill as
many as possible' whether they needed the buffalo or not").
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people generally want to use the land in the same way as
did their ancestors while the more assimilated people
want to use it as an economic resource. The question that
emerges is whether land is a "thing" to be used to gener-
ate income or a homeland on which people are supposed
to live in a sacred manner."
46
The introduction of European ideas can be seen as a barrier to tra-
dition, without which the Native people would remain "traditional"
and thus "want to use the land in the same way their ancestors did."
Traditional Native interactions with the earth based on the idea that
humans and other beings were equal. Thus, Native people tended not
to greatly affect or harm the surrounding ecosystems. It is true that
ecological communities changed as a result of Native actions. How-
ever, most environments were able to function perfectly well while
supporting both the Native groups and a wide variety of animals and
plants. Native groups adapted their living patterns to fit the land,
instead of adapting the land to fit their living patterns, and this life-
style was crucial to the sustainability of their environment.
47
The traditional Native land ethic was composed of two distinct
parts. First, Native peoples had a detailed understanding of how the
natural world worked. Secondly, they felt a sense of belonging and
firmly believed that humans had to "fit in" with the rest of nature
instead of trying to dominate it.48
Even today, Native peoples continue to speak against using land
and nature as a "thing," and in voicing these arguments many
hearken back to the traditional land ethics held by their respective
nations long before the coming of Europeans.49 For example, when
asked to summarize the relationship between humans and the land at
the end of the 20th century, a group of Iroquois responded:
"The original instructions direct that we who walk about
the Earth are to express a great respect, an affection and a
gratitude towards all spirits who create and support Life.
46. DELORIA, supra note 1, at 212.
47. Booth & Jacobs, supra note 9, at 31.
48. But see Minerd, supra note 14, at 10-11. (Despite the apparent
strength and appeal of "traditional" Native beliefs, there is no short-
age of evidence that indicates that modern Native communities have
subjugated the traditional tenets of ecological equality to economic
pursuits).
49. JOHN FIRE LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 27, at 595.
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When people cease to respect and express gratitude for
all many things, then all life will be destroyed, and hu-
man life on this planet will come to an end." 5
Ward Churchill also tries to summarize this Native land ethic in his
book Struggle for the Land:
"In simplest terms, the American Indian world view may
be this: Human beings are free (indeed, encouraged) to
develop their innate capabilities, but only in ways that
don't infringe upon other elements...of nature. Any activ-
ity going beyond this is considered an "imbalance," a
transgression, and is strictly prohibited. For example,
engineering was and is permissible, but only insofar as it
does not permanently alter the earth itself. Similarly, ag-
riculture was widespread, but only within norms that did
not supplant natural vegetation.',
5
'
Additionally, Churchill provides possibly the best outline of how
the United States would change if Native peoples suddenly suc-
ceeded in their land claims. First, population would be strictly con-
trolled. Churchill notes, "the population of indigenous nations eve-
rywhere has always been determined by the number of people who
could be sustained in a given environment or bio-region without
overpowering and thereby destroying that environment., 52 Second,
water in arid desert regions would be controlled very tightly, used
for drinking and other such necessities, but no rivers would be di-
verted in the interests of creating another Florida in the desert.
53
Third, on the subject of power generation, Churchill writes:
"Adios to air conditioners in every room. Sorry about
your hundred mile expanses of formerly streetlit ex-
pressway. Basic needs will be met, and that's it. Which
means we can also start saying goodbye to western rivers
being backed up like so many sewage lagoons behind
massive dams.. .we can begin to experience things like a
reduction in the acidity of southwestern rain water as fa-
cilities like the Four Corners Power Plant are cut back in
generating time, and eventually eliminated all together."
54
50. GRINDE & JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 267.
51. CHURCHILL, supra note 10, at 17.
52. Id. at 433.
53. Id. at 439.
54. Id. at 440.
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Another slightly less radical voice in modem times has come from
Matthew Coon-Come, Grand Chief of the Crees of northern Quebec.
Regarding the development of land that historically belonged to the
Cree, Coon-Come stated, "I am not against development or all con-
struction or economic activity.. .we understand that there is value in
progress and advancement.. .but I must ask if every project, if every
new structure, every new highway, if every dam is really 'develop-
ment."'
55
Given the strong attachment many Native peoples have shown to
traditional land ethics, a considerable likelihood exists that without
the European invasion of North America, the tenets of the Native
land ethic would remain basically the same today as they were 500
years ago. Most likely, practices similar to those discussed earlier in
this section would still prevail, emphasizing balance with nature and
a very different definition of "progress" than the one held by most of
non-Native America.
C. Unreasonable Expectations?
Scholarly debate exists as to the ecological consciousness of Na-
tive American communities and the extent to which these communi-
ties actually behaved in an environmentally friendly fashion. Evi-
dence of participation in the over-harvesting of game during the fur
trade,56 "jumping" buffalo over cliffs, 57 and sometimes uncontrolled
burning of forest 58 suggests that every Native community did not
55. GRINDE & JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 230-31.
56. See generally CALVIN MARTIN, KEEPERS OF THE GAME:
INDIAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FUR TRADE (1978).
57. Minerd, supra note 14.
58. See SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH
AND HISTORY 110-11 (1999). (Krech asserts: "It is clear that when
lit at optimum times of the year, fires had a positive impact on the
growth of grasses and animal forage, but in their pragmatism, Indi-
ans were not always concerned with how far, fast, or hot each and
every fire burned. Objectives such as delivering signals, or killing,
discomforting, or hindering one's enemies (the most commonly re-
ported uses of fire in the Plains) were not always compatible with
control. And accounts of campsite fires burning thousands of acres
are legion. Whether this was 'careless' behavior, as many disap-
provingly label it, depends on what, precisely, must be taken care of
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possess an ecological ethic that modem environmentalism should
model.
The popular romanticization of Native land ethics is also trouble-
some. Native American communities did not always behave in an
environmentally conscious fashion. However, cannot Native com-
munities still be considered conservationists despite occasional di-
vergence between their ecological principles and actual behavior?
Should their sometimes ecologically unfriendly behavior dissuade
conservationists and environmental lawyers from learning from the
positive qualities of Native ecological perspective? The answer is an
emphatic "no." Indeed, the Native American ecological ethic pro-
vides a much-needed value structure capable of guiding policy mak-
ers in environmental decision making.
III. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act 59 of 1973 ("ESA") was hailed as one
of the crowning achievements of the modem environmental move-
ment.60 In a high water case, the Supreme Court even interpreted the
ESA as a "a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered spe-
cies priority over the primary missions of federal agencies" and to
prevent the destruction of such species "whatever the cost."61 Sub-
and in what way. All this does not mean that Indians were not ecol-
ogically or systemically aware, only that they did not always think of
the ecological consequences of all the fires they lit. The fires used
aggressively to communicate were not kindled with identical consid-
erations in mind as the fires lit to enhance the productivity of
econiches").
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
60. See Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Pro-
tection of Endangered Species, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 265 (1991) (de-
scribing the ESA as the strongest piece of legislation ever devised to
protect non-human species); see also Elizabeth Foley, The Tarnish-
ing of an Environmental Jewel: The Endangered Species Act and the
Northern Spotted Owl, 8 J. LAND -USE & ENVTL. L. 253 (1992)
(characterizing the ESA as an "environmental jewel").
61. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85
(1978).
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sequent amendments to and interpretations of the act have made it
clear that the latter quote is an exaggeration. 62
The ESA has also been derided by the other side as the product of
radical extremists whose value preferences are highly suspect.
However, the ESA's proponents and detractors do agree on one
thing: the Act could be improved. A compromise, however, has not
been forthcoming and the reauthorization of a new, improved ESA
has become a perennial, and largely fruitless struggle since 1993.
The normative desirability of the ESA is dependent upon the value
preferences of those who participate in the debate. The Native
American value preferences and attitudes toward the environment
developed in the previous section suggest that if the ESA is to be
strengthened and the human habitat is to be maintained long term,
the preservation of the environment must take priority over the rights
of property owners and resource users.
A. Implementation of the ESA
Key to the reauthorization debate is a basic understanding of the
ESA as it was originally developed, and how the Act currently oper-
ates. 63 The fundamental purpose of the ESA is to protect species
from extinction and conserve the ecosystems on which they de-
pend.64 Protection under the ESA depends on the formal listing
process, which classifies at-risk species into one of two categories:
66 6threatened or endangered.67
62. See notes 86-94 infra, and accompanying text, describing the
designation of critical habitat, which explicitly requires the FWS to
take cost into account.
63. See generally James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species
Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look From a Litigator's Per-
spective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499 (1991); Daniel J. Rohlf, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1989); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Spe-
cies Act and its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior
and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993).
64. Endangered Species Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1973).
65. Id. § 1533(a)-(c).
66. Id. § 1532(20).
67. Id. § 1532(6).
20031
260 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Once a species is listed, the ESA provides for the designation of
"critical habitat"68 as well as development and implementation of
recovery plans.69 Any taking, possession, or sale of a listed species
is expressly prohibited. ° Additionally, the ESA charges federal
agencies with a duty to ensure that their actions do not "jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species" or
adversely affect critical habitat,7 1 though the ESA does provide a
limited exemption process for federal projects that infringe upon the
safety of listed species.72
1. Listing of Species
Listing authority under the ESA is bifurcated; the Secretary of the
Interior, acting through the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), han-
dles listings for all terrestrial species, and the Secretary of Com-
merce, acting through the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), lists marine species. 73 A species is classified as "endan-
gered" when the Secretary finds a species "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant part of its range ' 74 while "threatened"
is defined as likelihood to become endangered in the foreseeable
future. 75 The protections of the ESA are not entirely limited to ex-
pressly listed species; even though not formally listed, a species may
receive the protection of the ESA based on a similarity to an already
listed species.76
68. ESA § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b).
69. Id. § 1533(f).
70. See id. § 1538(a).
71. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
72. See ESA § 7(e)-(n), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)-(n).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
74. Id. §§ 1532(6), 1533(a).
75. Id. §§ 1532(20), 1533(a).
76. See ESA § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e); 50 C.F.R. § 17.52
(1992) (noting that species regulated due to similarity of appearance
do not receive the extensive protection of threatened and endangered
species. The taking of these similar species is allowed when proper
permits are obtained).
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The listing process may be initiated by the agency itself or by a
private party.7 7 When a private party petitions for a species to be
listed 8 , the appropriate agency has ninety days to determine whether
the petitioners have presented "substantial information" to support
listing, and if so, the agency has a year to decide how and when it
will proceed.79 Within one year following publication of the pro-
posed regulation, the Secretary must promulgate a rule, request a
one-time only six-month extension, or publish a notice of with-
drawal of the proposed rule.
80
In determining whether to list a species as threatened or endan-
gered, the Secretary may consider only five statutory criteria:
(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or cur-
tailment of its range or habitat;
(2) over-utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
(3) disease or predation;
(4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(5) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued exis-
tence.
8 1
It is important to note that the Secretary may not consider eco-
nomic impacts of the listing; rather, his decision must be founded
"solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data avail-
able." 82
77. See § 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(b).
78. Recently, the majority of new listings have been initiated by
private entities. See Amy Whritenour Adno, Waiting to Be Pro-
tected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of
Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & EcON. 29 (1999).
79. § 1533(b)(3). Because species are listed through the rulemak-
ing process, petitions from interested parties may be submitted under
the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §
553(e) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.52 (1992) (The Secretary must re-
spond to a petition within one year by making one of the following
findings: (1) the petition is not warranted, which terminates the
process; (2) the petition is warranted, which requires a proposed rule
for listing to be published promptly; or (3) the petition is warranted
but presently precluded by higher-priority listing proposals).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6).
81. Id. § 1533(a)(1).
82. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
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As of mid-2002, there were 1,261 plants and animals listed.83 A
backlog of about 260 plants and animals await consideration for the
list.8
4
2. Designation of Critical Habitat
Once a species is listed, the Secretary is charged with the duty of
designating critical habitat for each endangered or threatened spe-
cies, unless doing so would be impossible or imprudent.85 In deter-
mining critical habitat, the Secretary examines an area for features
essential to the species' survival such as food, shelter, and breed-
ing.86 Designation of critical habitat must be based upon the "best
scientific data available," but unlike the listing determination, the
Secretary must also consider economic impacts, 87 a requirement that
has recently been the basis for a number of challenges to critical
habitat designations.88 However, if failure to designate critical habi-
tat will result in extinction, then a critical habitat designation must be
made despite economic considerations.
89
The final rule designating the critical habitat of an endangered spe-
cies should be promulgated with the final rule listing the species.
90
However, if it is not possible to determine the critical habitat within
that time frame, the Secretary may have one additional year to des-
ignate a critical habitat.9' The final designation must include a de-
scription of the designated area and an evaluation of any public or
83. David Fleshler, The Endangered Species Act: Does the Law
Still Have Teeth?, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 2002, at IF.
84. Id.
85. ESA § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
86. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e) (1993).
87. ESA § 4(b)(92), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
88. See Tania Soussan, N.M. Suit Sets Off Habitat Backlash,
ALBEQUERQUE J., Aug. 11, 2002, at Al (discussing of the recent
spate of litigation challenging critical habitat designations on
grounds that the government did adequately taking into considera-
tion economic impacts when making the designations).
89. Id.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C).
91. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(A).
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private activities that might destroy or adversely impact the critical
habitat. 9
2
Unfortunately, the FWS seems to systematically ignore its obliga-
tion to designate critical habitat, taking the position that critical habi-
tat designation provides little or no additional benefit to a species.
93
As of 1999, only 120 of the 1181 listed species had critical habitat
designations.94
3. Recovery Plans
In addition to designation of critical habitat, the Secretary must de-
velop and implement recovery plans for the "conservation and sur-
vival" of the listed species "unless he finds that such a plan will not
promote conservation of the species.' '95 The Secretary must estab-
lish a priority list for developing recovery plans, giving top priority
to those species most likely to benefit from the listing.96 The re-
sponsibility for drafting a recovery plan is usually delegated to both
public and private sector biologists; recovery plans are technical,
scientific documents that identify the specific steps needed to con-
serve and recover a species. Recovery teams, whose membership
often include federal, state, and private actors, carry out the recovery
plans. 9
7
In its 1988 reauthorization of the ESA,98 Congress directed the
FWS and the NMFS, when drafting recovery plans, to provide "a
92. ESA § 4(b)(8), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(8).
93. Final Listing Priority Guidance for Fiscal Years 1998 and
1999, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,502-3 (May 8, 1998) (to be codified at X CFR
XXX).
94. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE DIVISION OF ENDANGERED
SPECIES, ENDANGERED SPECIES GENERAL STATISTICS, available at
http://www/fws.gov/r9endspp/theactstats.html (last modified Mar.
31, 1999).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1).
96. Id. §§ 1533(h)(4), (f)(1)(A) (placing particular emphasis on
giving priority to recovery plans for "those species that are, or may
be, in conflict with construction or other development projects or
other forms of economic activity".)
97. Id. § 1533(f)(2).
98. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, PUB. L. No.
100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 (1988).
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description of such site-specific management actions as may be nec-
essary to achieve the plan's goal for the conservation and survival of
the species" and "objective, measurable criteria which, when met,
would result in a determination ... that the species be removed from
the list.
'
"
99
Thus, the measurable goal of the recovery plans was to improve
the health of the species to the point that it no longer needed the pro-
tections of the Act. In fact, by 1989, the FWS would state, "restor-
ing endangered or threatened animals and plants to the point where
they are again secure, self-sustaining members of their ecosystems is
a primary goal of the [FWS] endangered species program."'100
The recovery goal, however, is a long way from being met. By
mid-2002, only 13 species had recovered to the point that they could
be taken off the endangered species list,'0' and in 2003, the FWS is
proposing to delist or downlist ten additional species.'0 2 Even as-
suming the FWS follows through on its proposals, the number of
species recovered is still small. Only seven of the species listed as
endangered or threatened have thus far become extinct.' 
03
Part of the reason for the limited number of recoveries under the
Act may lie in the fact that the plans are not directly enforceable.' 0 4
99. Id.
100. Availability of Draft Recovery Plans for the Colorado Squaw-
fish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub for Review and Com-
ment, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,616 (July 21, 1989).
101. David Fleshler, supra note 83.
102. Id.
103. Id. According to an independent study, 190 listed species
would have gone extinct without the ESA's protection. Id.
104. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 669 F.
Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987) (refusing to overturn a National Park
Service decision to keep the Fishing Bridge Campground in Yellow-
stone National Park open despite the plaintiff's argument that the
terms of the Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan required the campgrounds
to be closed); Nat'l Audobon Soc'y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (court of appeals refused to issue an injunction that would
have required the FWS to comply with its recovery plan for the Cali-
fornia Condor); Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp 834
(D.D.C. 1992) (court refused to enforce portions of the Northern
Rocky Mountain wolf Recovery Plan); and Fund for Animals v.
Rice, 85 F.3d 535 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (wherein the court refused to stop
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In a 1996 decision that has not been overturned, the 11 th Circuit
Court of Appeals stated what appears to be the current interpretation
that "Section 1533(f) makes it plain that recovery plans are for guid-
ance purposes only."' 0 5 Similarly, the courts will not require agen-
cies to prepare and enforce recovery plans, with one court stating,
"unlike other requirements under the ESA, such as the designaton of
critical habitat, the statute places no time constraint on the develop-
ment of recovery plans." 106
The courts, however, will intervene if they believe a recovery plan
is not adequate. The judiciary first indicated its willingness to scru-
tinize these recovery plans in the case of Fund for Animals v. Bab-
bitt,'°7 in which the court ruled that a plan for recovery for the Griz-
zly bear was inadequate because it did not include "objective, meas-
urable criteria" as required by Section 4(f). 0 8 The court also held
that the plan failed to adequately describe "site-specific management
actions" required under the same section. 09
Since the Fund for Animals case, the courts have continued to
carefully scrutinize recovery plans. For example, in the 2001 case of
Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt"' o the court rejected a recovery plan
for the Sonoran pronghorn on grounds that the FWS had failed to
satisfy the requirement of identifying objective measurable criteria
because the criteria were simply numerical goals, rather than means
for identifying the reduction of threats to the species."'
4. The Takings Prohibition
Under Section 9, the ESA prohibits the taking of endangered spe-
cies. 112 The ESA broadly defines "take" to include "harass, harm,
construction of a municipal landfill in wetlands within the habitat of
the endangered Florida Panther, which an environmental group said
violated the animal's recovery plan.)
105. Fund for Animals, 85 F.2d at 547.
106. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 597 (D. Mass. 1997).
107. 903 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995).
108. Id. at 111.
109. Id. at 106.
110. 130 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 2001).
111. Id. at 133.
112. ESA § 9(a)(1)(B),(C); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B),(C).
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pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."" 3 Agency
regulations further define "harm" to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding, or sheltering."' " 4 "Harass" encompasses "an in-
tentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of
injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt normal behavioral patterns." 1
5
Governments, as well as individuals, may be liable under this pro-
vision. For example, the Hawaii Department of Natural Resources
was found to have violated Section 9 by maintaining feral sheep and
goats in the endangered Palila bird's critical habitat." 6 The state of
Massachusetts's commercial fishing licensing program was found to
be a taking of the endangered right whale because the licensing regu-
lations made it impossible for a licensed commercial fishing opera-
tion to use gillnets or lobster pots without risk of taking a right
whale. 7
Section 11 allows the federal government to seek criminal sanc-
tions, civil penalties, and injunctions for "takings" or other violations
of the ESA. 118 Private citizens may seek only injunctions. Civil pen-
alties of not more than $25,000 may be imposed under Section
1 I(a)(1) if the violation is done "knowingly" and $500 otherwise."l 9
Section 1 l(b)(1) imposes a maximum criminal penalty of $50,000
and/or one year in jail against anyone who "knowingly" violates the
ESA. 120 These penalties are increased by 18 U.S.C. § 3571 to a
maximum per violation of $100,000 for individuals and $200,000 for
corporations.
The ESA provides that the takings prohibitions may also be ex-
tended to threatened species if such protections are needed to con-
serve the species. 12 1 The FWS did choose to extend the prohibi-
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
114. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
115. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
116. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land and Natural Res., 471 F. Supp.
985 (D. Hawaii 1979).
117. Strahon v. Coxe, 127 F. 3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
119. See id. § 1540(a)(1).
120. See id. § 1540(b)(1).
121. ESA § 4(d); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
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tion,122 but limited the applicability of the takings prohibition when a
"special rule,"' 123 referred to a 4(d) rule, had been adopted.
These 4(d) rules set the conditions under which incidental takings
of a threatened species will be allowed, including requirements that
will minimize and mitigate the impacts of the taking and ensure that
the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival
and recovery of the species in the wild. 24 Other similarly protected
threatened species include Utah prairie dogs, 125 American alliga-
tors, 126 blue-tailed mole skink and sand skink.127
5. Federal Agency Obligations
The ESA charges federal agencies with ensuring that their activi-
ties are "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any en-
dangered species or threatened species" or adversely affect critical
habitat. 128  Prior to action, the agency must ask the Secretary
whether any listed species or critical habitat may be found in the
proposed action area. 29 If the action area contains any listed species
or critical habitat, the acting agency must prepare a biological as-
sessment identifying any listed species likely to be affected. 3 ° The
biological assessment contains a list of species in the action area, a
review of biological or botanical material, the results of a field in-
spection, and sometimes statements of experts in the field. 3 ' If the
122. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.31 (a).
123. See id. pt. 17.31(c). See also 50 C.F.R. pts. 17.40-46 (special
rules for mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fishes, and crusta-
ceans).
124. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.32(b)(2).
125. See id. pt. 17.40(g)(2) (prairie dog may be taken on private
land in accordance with state laws, subject to conditions limiting the
number and time of takings.).
126. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.42(a)(2)(ii) (alligator can be taken in accor-
dance with state laws and regulations subject to tagging and record
keeping requirements).
127. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.42(d)(1) - (2).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
129. Id. § 1536(c).
130. Id. § 1636(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(d)(1).
131. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12.
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biological assessment ends with a "no risk" finding with which the
FWS concurs, the process ends.
32
If the biological assessment reveals that a species is likely to be af-
fected, the agency must formally consult with the Secretary. 33 Fol-
lowing consultation the Secretary must issue a biological opinion
detailing whether the proposed action would jeopardize the species
or critical habitat. 134 If the extinction of the species is a possible
consequence of agency action, the biological opinion will contain a
listing of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the proposed
agency action that the Secretary feels would not jeopardize the spe-
cies while allowing the project to proceed. 135 The biological opinion
must include an incidental take statement, identifying whether the
proposed action might incidentally result in a take, or loss of the
species, as well as the extent of this take and reasonable and prudent
measures to minimize the impact of such takings on the species. 1
36
The ultimate responsibility for insuring that the action does not
jeopardize a listed species lies with the acting agency; it may accept
or reject the advice of the consulting agency.'3 7 Thus, the biological
opinion does not necessarily preclude agency action so long as the
agency takes "alternative, reasonably adequate steps to insure the
continued existence" of listed species. 138 However, the agency must
use the "best scientific and commercial data available" in whatever
decision it ultimately makes;' 39 therefore, before straying from the
suggestions of the biological opinion, the agency should have some
reliable basis for its action.
a. Incidental Take Permits
The ESA recognizes that not all takings can be prevented, and al-
lows permits to be issued for the "incidental take" of an endangered
species when the take in incidental to an otherwise lawful activity.
132. Id. §§ 402.12 (j) and 402.14 (b).
133. Id. § 402.12(d)(2).
134. ESA § 7(b)(3)(A); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
135. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (1993).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
137. ESA § 7(a)(2); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R § 402.15(b).
138. Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 651, 660 (9th Cir.
1988).
139. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1636(a)(2).
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When such a permit is desired, the applicant must submit a habitat
conservation plan (HCP), describing any impacts likely to result
from the taking, proposed measures to minimize the impacts from
the taking, funding available to implement the measures and alterna-
tives considered. 0
The HCP will be approved only when there has been a finding that
any taking is incidental; that the applicant will minimize and miti-
gate impacts; that adequate funding is available; and that the taking
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recov-
ery of the species in the wild. 4 ' Additionally, other "necessary or
appropriate" measures may be required. 42 Non-federal landowners
may receive "no surprises" assurances that no additional conserva-
tion measures will be required if additional impacts on the species
are caused by "unforeseen circumstances." 1
43
b. Exemptions
If a proposed agency action will threaten a listed species, the
agency, license applicant, or governor of the affected state may seek
an exemption from the Endangered Species Committee.'" The En-
dangered Species Committee consists of the Secretaries of Agricul-
ture, Interior, and the Army; the Chair of the Council of Economic
Advisors; the Administrators of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
and a seventh member from the affected state chosen by the Presi-
dent.145 To grant the exemption, at least five of the seven members
must find: (1) that no reasonable and prudent alternatives exist; (2)
the action's benefits clearly outweigh the benefits of any alterna-
tives; (3) the action is in the public interest; (4) the action is of na-
tional or regional significance; and (5) the applicant has not taken
steps that foreclose implementation of reasonable and prudent alter-
natives. 46 The order granting the exemption must establish reason-
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2)(B).
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539 (2)(A)(iv) and (2)(B)(v).
143. 63 Fed. Reg. 8859-8873 (Feb. 23, 1988).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).
145. Id. § 1536(e).
146. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
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able mitigation and enhancement measures necessary to minimize
risks of extinction.' 
47
6. Safe Harbor Agreements for Voluntary Habitat Improvements
In 1999, in an attempt to provide both private and non-federal pub-
lic landowners with an incentive to maintain and enhance protected
species' habitats on their property, FWS enacted a "safe harbor" pol-
icy. 148 Under this policy, landowners may enter into agreements
with the FWS to carry out positive actions to benefit endangered
species without incurring new or added land use restrictions on their
property. 149 In other words, the landowner agrees to do something
positive for an endangered species that he has no legal obligation to
do, in return for which he is assured that his action will not cause
any increase in the legal restrictions on the use of his land under the
ESA.
If there are already restrictions on the use of the land due to the ex-
isting presence of endangered species, those restrictions become
"baseline" restrictions. Where such baseline restrictions exist, the
safe harbor agreement assures the landowner that he or she will not
be subjected to additional restrictions under the ESA, even though
the species in question may become more numerous or widespread
on the property.
Safe harbor agreements are authorized under more than one section
of the ESA. The first such agreement was authorized under Section
10(a)(1)(B), which authorizes the taking of listed species incidental
to any "otherwise lawful activity," the same section under which
habitat conservation plans have been authorized. 150 Today, most
147. 50 C.F.R. § 453.03(a)(2) (1993).
148. FWS and Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospherc Admin., "An-
nouncement of Final Safe Harbor Policy," 64 Fed. Reg. 32717-26
(June 17, 1999).
149. Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg.
32,717-26 (June 17, 1999), available at http://www.environmental
defense.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
150. Safe harbor agreements can be considered a subset of HCPs.
They differ from typical HCPs, however, in that a typical HCP, in-
volves a landowner who has immediate plans to do something harm-
ful to a listed species and must prepare an HCP to mitigate for the
proposed harmful activity, but in a safe harbor agreement, the land-
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safe harbor agreements are entered into under the authority of sec-
tion 10(a)(1)(A), which authorizes any otherwise prohibited action
"to enhance the propagation or survival" of a listed species. 151
B. Problems Associated with the ESA
Despite its characterization as an "environmental jewel"' 52 and the
"pit bull of environmental law,"' 53 the ESA has multiple problems.
Perhaps the most severe shortcoming of the ESA is the lack of suffi-
cient funding needed to carry out species conservation. Other short-
comings include the sluggish listing process, the piecemeal and reac-
tive structure of the statutory provisions, and the ESA's general fail-
ure to adequately protect biodiversity.
Given the characteristic disunity of American politics, unsurpris-
ingly, a major problem with the ESA stems from its lack of financial
support. For example, the average cost to list a species is
$60,000;154 yet during the early 1990s, Congress customarily allotted
only $3.5 million per year for the listing process and only $30 mil-
lion to $40 million for the entire endangered species program.' 55
Clearly, Congress did not allocate enough money to carry out the
owner's only immediate plan is to do something beneficial to a listed
species, such as create habitat for it where currently there is none. He
may or may not eventually want to do something in the future that
will a permit, but if he does, the permit issued in conjunction with
his safe harbor agreement gives him that future authorization. In
other words, the difference between the two is that the former au-
thorizes the immediate incidental taking of a listed species that is
currently present on a property whereas the latter authorizes the fu-
ture incidental taking of a species that is not now present and that
would not be present in the future if the beneficial action voluntarily
undertaken by the landowner were not undertaken.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(1)(A).
152. Foley, supra note 60, at 253.
153. See Robert A. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Pre-
dictability; Habitat Conservation Planning Under The Endangered
SpeciesAct of 1973, 21 ENVTL L. 588 n.3 (1991).
154. Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Shield or Sword, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1990, at Al.
155. Id.
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ESA. Lack of a sufficient budget has also contributed to the lack of
enforcement. 
56
The ESA is also less effective because of its slow listing process.
For example, between 1973 and 1993, an average of only twenty-six
species per year were listed. 57 In. 1992, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) reported 105 species as being on the "warranted but
precluded" list for over two years. 58 Despite Congress' mandate to
designate critical habitat for listed species at the time of the listing
"to the extent prudent and determinable,"' 159 a 1992 GAO study
showed that critical habitat had been designated for only sixteen per-
cent of the listed species.' Further, of the 651 species examined,
546 had no critical habitat designated or pending.' 61
Some have criticized the piecemeal and reactive nature of the
ESA.162 The ESA affords protection only when a species nears the
brink of extinction, a point when intervention is costly and often in-
effective. 163 The ESA then requires drastic, expensive rescue efforts
where preventive measures would probably have saved a greater
number of species at a lower cost. 164 For example, in his critique of
the ESA, David Blockstein compares the ESA to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
156. See e.g., Vill. of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D.
Alaska 1983), affd Vill. of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th
Cir. 1984).
157. Houck, supra note 63, at 285.
158. Id. at 292; see ESA § 4(b)(3)(B)(iii), 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(3)(B)(iii).
159. ESA § 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
160. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTION 29
(1992).
161. Id.
162. See e.g., Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the
United States: The Case for Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to
Protect the Nation's Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
175, 201 (1992); John C. Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conser-
vation Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. at 501
(1994).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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(CERCLA). 65  Congress designed both statutes as remedial re-
sponses to specific disasters.' 66 Congress eventually responded to
the problem of toxic waste with preventive statutes such as the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 167 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). 16 Just as this experience suggests,
it may be cheaper to prevent hazardous waste problems from devel-
oping through RCRA and TSCA, so it may be more effective to pre-
vent species from becoming endangered in the first place.
At least one critic has noted several reasons for the failure of the
ESA to protect bio-diversity. 169 First, in practice, the ESA protects
high profile creatures, birds and mammals that are appealing to the
public, and ignore other species important in protecting biodiver-
sity.170 Second, species recovery plans likewise do not reflect the
importance of the species' contributions to biodiversity. 17' Third,
the terms "threatened" and "endangered" cannot be objectively de-
fined, allowing politics and economics to significantly affect the list-
ing decision. 172 Fourth, many FWS listing decisions are made in
closed-door proceedings, without sufficient input from outside scien-
tists. 17' Fifth, the ESA does not sufficiently protect habitat reserves
in order to sustain recovered populations.174 Finally, federal agen-
cies tend to discount the uncertainty in their decisions. 1
75
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
166. Id.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1.988).
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1988).
169. See Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endan-
gered Species Act Doesn't Work - and What to do About It,
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Sept. 1991, at 273.
170. Id. (Rohlf argues that the FWS often bases its listing decisions
on the political rather than scientific importance of the species).
171. Id. at 275. (Rohlf indicates that the FWS has spent 50% of its
funding from 1982 through 1986 on twelve species, only six of
which were highly threatened. None of the species were considered
keystone or indicator species, species central to the ecosystem or
indicators of the system's health).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 276.
174. Id. at 277-78.
175. Rohlf, supra note 169, at 278-9.
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Despite some of the ESA's shortcomings, it should not be criti-
cized for restricting American economic growth. Section 7 of the
ESA, which is the focus of many developers' ire, simply has not had
much of an impact on economic development activities. While a few
notable projects have been temporarily delayed or modified, with a
great deal of attendant publicity, almost ninety percent of consulta-
tions are disposed of informally.
76
Over 90% of the remaining 10% that required formal consultation
resulted in findings of no jeopardy. 177 Of the remaining few where
there was a jeopardy finding, reasonable and prudent alternatives
allowed the project to continue in a majority of the cases. 178 For
example, during the early 1990's, only eighteen projects were for-
mally terminated, less than one percent of formal consultations. 79
These statistics seem to contradict arguments that the Act is restrict-
ing American economic growth. 18 In fact, the numbers give rise to
a fear that biological agencies may be bending over backwards to
find less harmful alternatives, perhaps putting some species at
greater risk than Congress had intended. 181
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF NATIVE AMERICAN ETHIC FOR THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Disagreement on how to modify the ESA may indicate a lukewarm
commitment to the protection of endangered species. However, the
Native American ecological ethic might provide a positive guide for
Congress' consideration. With the infusion of Native perspectives on
the environment, the ESA could be a useful tool to serve the needs of
vanishing wildlife. 82
176. Id. at 279.
177. Id.
178. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES,
TALK IS CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS
UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 5 (1992).
179. Id. at ii.
180. See Ted Gup, The Stealth Secretary, TIME, May 25, 1992, at
57-58.
181. Houck, supra note 63, at 319.
182. In particular, we refer to two specific Native ideas: first, that
there exists no natural hierarchy and humans are co-equals with all
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The numerous problems associated with the ESA can be attributed,
to the divisive nature of American politics. Clearly, Congress has:
(1) failed to fund the ESA to the degree necessary to carry out its
mandate; (2) constructed the ESA such that its protections become
available only after species are on the brink of extinction; and (3)
created a politicized enforcement mechanism that apparently cedes
much to economic interests. However, poor administration and lack
of funding is not a phenomenon unique to the ESA.
On the other hand, some of the ESA's failures might be attributed
to the conflict between conservationist ideals and the European cul-
tural understandings dominant in the American government. Euro-
centric Americans tend to commodify nature and view themselves as
both separate from and existing on a higher plane than the rest of
nature. While such conceptions of nature do not necessarily imply
that preservation will always take a back seat to economic or devel-
opmental preferences, they do pose a great danger to preservation of
endangered species. Indeed, the checkered history of the ESA's en-
forcement is indicative that a robust commitment to preservation has
almost always played second fiddle to other usually economic con-
cerns.
Attitudes of natural equality and anti-commodification held by Na-
tive Americans, however lead us to certain conclusions in the debate
about environmental standards and the ESA. First, greater funding
for the ESA is needed. Second, the criteria for listing species should
be relaxed and redefined. Finally, political and economic concerns
must play a smaller role in the listing process. With Native Ameri-
can assumptions about the equality of all creation, the issue at hand
becomes not which human economic activities take priority over
endangered species lower in the hierarchy. Instead, we would ask,
how does any proposed activity affect creatures whose status as be-
ings is equal to our own?
At present, given that Congress will not allocate funds sufficient to
fully protect threatened species, choices must be made about which
species will be protected and which species will receive designated
critical habitat. In so choosing, some species will be consigned to
extinction, an unjust fate in light of Native attitudes toward natural
equality. However, if humans and wildlife were unified, human ac-
tion that causes extinction would be viewed as an act of genocide.
other creation; second, that nature should not be viewed as a com-
modity.
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In addition, the criteria for listing a species as threatened or endan-
gered seem to violate the principles of both Native equality and Na-
tive resistance to commodifying nature. Under the current system,
waiting until a species is on the verge of extinction prior to protec-
tion suggests that before that time, the direct exploitation of the spe-
cies or the indirect economic exploitation of habitat has been deemed
an acceptable cost. Such a calculus would likely be unacceptable
from the Native perspective. 83
Hunting and using animals or their habitat was quite acceptable to
Native Americans; they were not vegetarians. However, waiting un-
til a species is pushed to the brink of extinction before offering pro-
tection is inconsistent with their concept of natural equality. Fur-
thermore, the overuse of such species or their habitat is equivalent to
commodifying nature.
Finally, to conform with Native American ecological attitudes, the
political and economic emphasis of the ESA's enforcement process
should be de-emphasized. While the ESA is supposed to consider
economic factors only in the designation of critical habitat, the fact
that well over 90% of projects that have required consultation for
potential harm to endangered species have been informally dis-
pensed with and that most of the remaining 10% of projects contin-
ued based on the "reasonable and prudent" alternative exception to
ESA guidelines suggest that economic interests have significant in-
fluence on the enforcement process.' 84 Thus, there is great concern
that the ESA is being flouted in the interests of economic develop-
ment.
When about 1% of projects are considered being restricted because
of threats to endangered species, it is reasonable to conclude that the
survival of species and goals for economic development are not
equally weighted for consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
The current legislators are relatively unengaged with conserva-
tional goals. For example, as noted previously, one of the problems
with the ESA is that species do not get protection until they are on
the brink of extinction. Yet, incorporated in legislation proposed in
183. See supra notes 45-46.
184. See supra notes 130,139.
[VOL. XIV
AMENDING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
both 2001185 and 2002186 are proposals that would slow down the
listing process, thereby exacerbating this problem.' 
87
In a search for ecological guidance, Native Americans provide a
powerful vision. That is often hard for contemporary observers to
comprehend: forget the roots of our existence at our collective peril.
Unless we treat our environment with respect, we will waste away in
our own garbage, all the while hoping to discover a magic techno-
logical fix with which to buy a little more time.
The ESA is a fundamentally sound piece of legislation; if aligned
with Native American ecological attitudes, properly funded, and
more rigorously enforced, the ESA could play a vital role in achiev-
ing a long term, sustainable habitat for humans and wildlife alike.
185. Endangered Species Listing and Delisting Process Reform Act
of 2001, S. 347, 107th Cong. (2001).
186. Sound Science for Endangered Species Decisionmaking Act
of 2002, S. 1912 107 th Cong. (2002).
187. H.R. 1402, 10 7 th Cong. (2001) would require an additional
step in the listing process-an independent scientific peer review
before implementation of a finding that any species is endangered or
threatened. The amendment would further require that no species
could be listed unless the Secretary had data obtained from species
observation in the field. The Endangered Species Listing and Delist-
ing Process Reform Act of 2001, S. 347, 10 7th Cong. (2001) would
lengthen the listing process by adding the requirement of two public
hearings in the state where the species is found prior to the species'
listing.
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